

Historical Background

Most of Sudan's history since independence in 1956 has been dominated by a series of center-periphery conflicts that have served to undermine the legitimacy of the state. The root cause of these regional divisions can be traced back, in-part, to the colonial era when Britain issued the Closed District Ordinance in 1922 which essentially closed off the borders between the north and the south, creating two separate colonial administrations. When it was decided in the 'Sudanization' plan leading up to independence that the two regions would join to form a unified country it became quite clear that the political elite were dominated by the north, while the south remained tremendously underdeveloped in comparison.¹ In response to their perceived dominance by the north, in 1955 thousands of southern military personnel and police forces mutinied and fled into neighbouring countries from which they launched a low intensity war against the government. Initially a disorganized group of rebels, the movement became a coherent political and military entity who eventually united as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) headed by Joseph Lagu.² Meanwhile, politics in the capital Khartoum, dominated by the northern elite, were tumultuous as well. In 1969 Gaafar Nimeiry became the fifth President of Sudan (in a mere thirteen years) by way of a military coup. He briefly lost power in a communist coup in 1971 that was in turn defeated by his own supporters shortly afterwards, landing him back in the seat of power.³ These events demonstrated the zero-sum nature of Sudanese politics, with elites fighting for power and popular expression silenced. Nimeiry used his powers to finally negotiate an end to the seventeen-year conflict between the north and south in 1972 by granting the SSLM significant regional autonomy and making Sudan a secular state, outlined in the Addis Ababa Agreement.⁴ However, the war had taken its toll on Sudan – mostly on the south. By the end of the conflict several hundred thousand people had been displaced and half a million had died.⁵

Relative peace lasted in Sudan for over a decade, yet there were two important factors that aggravated tensions between the north and the south. The first was the discovery of oil in Southern Sudan in 1977 and the second was Nimeiry's alignment with Islamic groups to consolidate his power in the early 1980s. The latter led to his declaration of Sharia law in 1983 that applied to non-Muslims and the South Sudanese, in explicit violation of the 1972 ceasefire.⁶ In response southern forces mobilized as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) under the leadership of John Garang, unleashing a conflict which proved to be one of the largest conflicts since WWII, displacing four million people and killing almost two million.⁷ The conflict officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9th, 2005 following two years of negotiations. The most notable provisions of the CPA give Southern Sudan regional autonomy for six years at which point a referendum of succession will take place, require a re-writing of the constitution to exempt non-Muslims and members of Southern Sudan from Sharia law, give key government ministry positions to members of SPLM as part of a Government of National Unity (GNU), and split oil revenue equally between the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the GNU in Khartoum.⁸ To monitor this agreement,

¹ El-Battahani, Atta. "A Complex Web: Politics and Conflict in Sudan." Accord (2006). 29 Jan. 2007

² Global Security website <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm>>.

³ El-Battahani, Atta. "

⁴ Global Security website

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Ibid

⁷ El-Battahani, Atta.

⁸ "A Summary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement." Accord (2006).

the Security Council passed Resolution 1590 which authorized a 10,000 strong peacekeeping force to be sent to Southern Sudan.⁹ This sounds like a solid basis for sustained peace, but Eric Reeves, one of the leading experts on Sudan, has argued that the National Congress Party (NCP) – the current ruling party which constitutes the vast majority of the GNU – has attempted to renege their promises by withholding key ministry positions from the SPLM and creating “shadow bureaucracies that will ensure real power, of all kinds, won’t be shared.”¹⁰ Reeves believes that the most important implication of this manipulation will be that the GoSS will be unable to collect its share of oil revenues which are vital to the rebuilding of Southern Sudan.

At the height of the Second Sudanese Civil War elite struggles in Khartoum once again gave way to a series of military coups with Nimeiry being ousted in 1985, and his successor, Sadiq al-Mahdi, being deposed on June 30th, 1989 by Omar al-Bashir, the current Sudanese President.¹¹ To consolidate his power, al-Bashir purged tens of thousands of people in the army, police, and civil service, banned political opposition and trade unions, and introduced amputation and stoning as part of the expansion of Sharia law.¹² With the government of Sudan now pushing the Islamic agenda, al-Bashir gave shelter to Osama bin Laden in 1991 who used his time to strengthen the fledgling Al Qaeda and train fundamentalist recruits before he was expelled in 1996 under pressure from foreign governments.

In addition to al-Bashir’s infamous legacy of civil war, suppression of human rights, and protection of terrorists, further violence emerged in Sudan under his rule when a rebellion in the east of the country broke out in early 2005 while the government was attempting to negotiate the CPA. Supported by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) from Darfur, the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions formed a coalition to push the government for regional autonomy and oil revenue after they had been excluded from pursuing their demands as part of the CPA negotiations.¹³ Many of the Beja ethnic group had been in rebellion for over a decade, but by joining a coalition in 2005 as the Eastern Front, they became a coherent force. After carrying out some successful attacks on government positions, and threatening to halt the flow of oil by destroying the connecting pipeline to Port Sudan, 20 protesters were killed and hundreds detained without trial under the orders of Khartoum.¹⁴ Eventually, Eritrea was able to bring both sides to the table in October 2006 to sign the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) which plans on bringing development money to the region in the coming years.¹⁵

While efforts to reestablish security and bring redevelopment to the south and east are huge tasks for the government, the most urgent issue pressing Sudan right now is in the western region of Darfur where conflict has been increasing in severity since its beginning in 2003. The conflict began when two rebel groups – JEM and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) – launched attacks against government posts, garrisons, and police stations, claiming that for years the government had neglected the Darfur region and inadequately addressed its financial and humanitarian needs.¹⁶ With most of its troops still involved in the south, the government responded by backing local militias known as the *janjaweed* to repress the rebellion. For three

⁹ UN Resolution 1590

¹⁰ Reeves, Eric. "The Slow Collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South Sudan." (2005).

¹¹ El-Battahani, Atta.

¹² Ibid

¹³ Sudan: Saving Peace in the East. International Crisis Group. 2005.

¹⁴ Cornwell, Richard. "Sudan: All Quiet on the Eastern Front?" (2005).

¹⁵ "A Summary of the DPA and ESPA in Accord " Accord (2006).

¹⁶ Global Security website <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/darfur.htm>>

years the *janjaweed* have terrorized the region, forcing up to two million people to flee their homes in the greatest case of ethnic cleansing in the 21st century.¹⁷ International advocacy organizations including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented the human rights violations by the *janjaweed*, claiming that they are using systematic rape as a weapon, targeting the killing of women and children, reminiscent of the Rwandan genocide, and massacring dozens of people at a time.¹⁸ Furthermore, the United States government has publicly called the crisis in Darfur genocide, although for political reasons the United Nations Security Council has failed to echo these sentiments.

Adding to the chaos in Darfur, several hundred thousand refugees have crossed the western border into neighbouring Chad and Central African Republic which threatens to destabilize the wider region. *Janjaweed* militias have frequently crossed the porous border and attacked Darfuri refugees, which prompted Chadian President Idriss Déby to declare war on Sudan whom he claims is destabilizing Chad and supporting rebels that wish to overthrow him.¹⁹ Yet despite the grievances between Sudan and Chad, and despite the appalling brutality of the ongoing conflict in Darfur, the situation remains dire for the millions of people at risk. In May, 2006 negotiations between rebels and the government led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), but only one rebel faction – the SLM led by Minni Minnawi – signed the agreement, thereby ensuring that it would not provide a comprehensive grounds for peace in the region.²⁰ Since then, fighting has intensified rather than decreased, with the direct targeting of humanitarian agencies being used as a new tactic aimed to demoralize them and ensure that they cannot provide assistance to those most at risk. Moreover, an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force of 7,000 personnel has proven insufficient in protecting civilians as they lack troops and military equipment to fight the better armed *janjaweed* forces. To date, the United Nations has also shown its reluctance to act, as objections from China and Russia on the Security Council continue to prevent any peacekeeping response without the consent of the Sudanese government – the very same administration which is backing the current atrocities.²¹ Until the UN can uphold its ‘responsibility to protect’, wide scale atrocities will continue in Darfur where people are dying every day of starvation and targeted killing. While many media estimates pinpoint the number of casualties in Darfur around 200,000 thus far, more recent accounts estimate that some 400,000 to 450,000 have people have died.²²

Assessing Sudan as a Failed State: Social and Political Indicators

Using our working definition of a failed state as “a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders”, it is easy to see where Sudan fits in this picture. Quite simply put, the government of Sudan is actively pursuing the destruction of a large segment of its population in Darfur (where there are about 4 million people). Or, as Michael Walzer has said, “when a government turns savagely on its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a political community to which the idea of self-determination might apply.”²³ Empirical evidence also backs up the claim that

¹⁷ BBC News

¹⁸ World Report 2007: Sudan. Human Rights Watch. 2006.

¹⁹ BBC News

²⁰ Hottinger, Julian T. "The Darfur Peace Agreement: Expectations Unfulfilled." Accord (2006).

²¹ BBC News

²² Reeves, Eric. "Quantifying Genocide in Darfur." (2006).

²³ Donnelly, Jack. Universtal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. 2nd ed. Ithica, New York: Cornell UP, 2003. 246.

Sudan is a failed state. The Fund for Peace produces the annual ‘Failed States Index’; Sudan was ranked third in 2005, the first publication of the Index, and first in 2006.²⁴ However, it cannot be said that Sudan tops the list solely because the government is perpetuating genocide, or at the least ethnic cleansing, against its own population. Although that certainly is the leading reason, there is a complex web of interrelating social, political, and economic factors that combine to classify Sudan as a failed state.

First, it is essential to attest to the poverty and human suffering in Sudan. The best indicators for this are the infant mortality rate and average life expectancy because they outline the ability for one to take care of themselves in the form of basic necessities such as food and healthcare, and assaults to ones livelihood like war or famine. Most statistics estimate that the infant mortality rate in Sudan is 6.1% and the average life expectancy is 58.9 years – both of which fall in the bottom third of world statistics.²⁵ However, recent World Bank reports indicate that in some parts of the country infant mortality is up to 25%, showing the devastating effects of decades of conflict in Southern Sudan and more recently in Darfur.²⁶

Indeed these statistics attest to the overall lack of infrastructure in Sudan of key social services. For example, safe drinking water, the most essential resource for one’s health and livelihood, cannot be obtained by 75% of the population, while in some rural regions access is limited to 14%.²⁷ In addition, an estimated 70% of the population does not have appropriate access to sanitary facilities which leads to high rates of disease including typhoid, hepatitis A, and bacterial diarrhea. Shortages of sanitation facilities are so acute that fewer than 50% of schools and hospitals have safe water or sanitary latrines²⁸. Health facilities are also in short supply after prolonged conflicts have destroyed hospitals and clinics throughout the country. This has led to the spread of easily preventable diseases like measles where nearly half of newborn children are not inoculated. Finally, education infrastructure is equally poor as only 60.1% of children were enrolled in primary school in 2004 with a drop to 32.8% for secondary school²⁹. This means that the vast majority of Sudanese drop out of school before they reach high school. Yet, if all these numbers did not already attest to the sheer poverty and lack of government ability to protect its citizens, when we examine the differences between north and south, the data is truly shocking. In Southern Sudan, 90% of the population is poor and 48% of children are malnourished. Furthermore, only 22% are enrolled in school – a third of the national average – with only 11% of girls in school. This contributes to a 70% illiteracy rate, making Southern Sudan the worst area of the world in terms of access to education. Overall, 25,000 teachers are needed in the south to boost enrollment to 52% by 2010.³⁰

Second, it is important to examine the level of civic and political freedoms in Sudan. Freedom House, the leading NGO in mapping freedom and liberties around the world classifies Sudan as “not free” because the population is unable to exercise its popular will in fair elections. They point to December 2000 where opposition parties – believed to be supported by the majority of Sudanese – boycotted elections “in protest of what they said were attempts by a totalitarian

²⁴ The Failed States Index. Fund for Peace. 2006.

²⁵ CIA World Factbook website <<https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html>>

²⁶ World Bank website

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Joint Assment Mission Report. 2005.

regime to impart the appearance of fairness”.³¹ Moreover, Freedom House documents systematic censorship in popular media and education where individuals often practice self-censorship in order to avoid hassle from the authorities. Journalists have been arbitrarily imprisoned or had their publications shut down, while all radio and television are state-owned and thus must reflect official policy.³² While the government continues to suppress the political will and free speech of its people, it also scores the lowest in the world in protection of fundamental human rights in the Failed States Index.³³ The most evident examples come from Darfur where women are raped daily, millions are forced to flee from their homes, tens of thousands of people are being killed by state-sanctioned militias, and the vast majority of deaths occur because of malnutrition, poor sanitation, little safe drinking water, and lack of access to the most basic health facilities. It is no surprise, then, that in its annual Corruption Perception Index which measures how international experts and average citizens of each country perceive their government’s accountability, Transparency International ranked Sudan 156 of 163 countries, amongst the dubious company of Haiti, Iraq, Myanmar, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Bangladesh.³⁴

Finally, it is essential to analyze the security situation in Sudan. When performing country risk analysis, one of the most important indicators is regional volatility and contagion as conflict is likely to spill over across borders in the form of rebel groups or displaced persons. In the case of Sudan, it shares a mostly porous, undefended border with eight different countries in one of the most unstable regions of the world. For example, the Lord’s Resistance Army of northern Uganda, a brutal rebel group known for its widespread use of amputations and recruitment of child soldiers, frequently takes refuge in Southern Sudan. In addition, Sudan shares a small section of border with the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo where there has been fighting between various ethnic militias over control of illegal mining activity.³⁵ There is also the possibility of regional instability should there be conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, two neighbouring countries which have longstanding issues that nearly rose into all-out war in 2005. Finally, there is the extremely fragile situation in Chad whose government has declared war with Sudan as a result of cross-border raids by *janjaweed* militias and the recent outpour of over 200,000 refugees into Chad.³⁶

Over the past two decades in Sudan, mostly under the rule of Omar al-Bashir, 2.5 million people have died as a result of violent conflict and at least six million people have been displaced – some, likely more than once. This accounts for over 20% of Sudan’s 40 million people. With these numbers it is impossible to deny that Sudan is a failed state as it cannot offer its population security from internal threats. Overall, the indicators that describe access to social services, political freedoms, and regional stability back this claim up as the government is furthermore unable to secure basic human rights for its own people. The abysmal performance of Sudan in addressing the needs of its population is a result of decades of political instability which created barriers to development in regions outside Khartoum. The devastating effects are still being felt across the country.

³¹ Freedom House website <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7063>

³² Ibid

³³ Fund for Peace website

³⁴ Corruption Perception Index. Transparency International. 2006.

³⁵ BBC news

³⁶ Ibid

Natural Resources and the Economy

Conflict in the Sudan is often characterized as being between competing ethnic or religious groups. For example, the First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars are often described as being fought “between the Muslim north and the Christian and Animist south”, and the conflict in Darfur is most often referred to as between Arab militias and black Africans (despite both being predominantly Muslim). The reality, however, is that conflict in Sudan is consistently a result of economic marginalization where Khartoum controls the resources and withholds their profits from the peripheral regions who are forced into such dire poverty that their only option is to revolt. This has been the case in the east, in Southern Sudan, and in Darfur.

The most sought after resource is oil. Sudan exports 275,000 barrels per day³⁷ whose profits comprise 60% of government revenue.³⁸ In fact, thanks to oil revenue, macroeconomic performance in Sudan has been tremendous in recent years, with the economy experiencing growth rates of 8% in 2005 and 9.6% in 2006³⁹. Oil revenues have also helped pay off their national debt which was a dangerous 157% of GDP in 2001 and is now only 79%, while boosting their foreign reserves from 0.3 months of imports in 2002 to 2.6 months of imports in 2006.⁴⁰ With oil prices constantly on the rise and with production set to increase thanks to Chinese investment, the economic picture will only continue to improve in the future. Yet no matter how high the revenues are, unless they are evenly distributed across the country, political conflict will continue to undermine Sudan’s potential for lasting peace. Most of the oil is in Southern Sudan, but until the signing of the CPA, there was no promise of any revenue returning to the region whose resources had been exploited. We have seen the tremendous underdevelopment in education, nutrition, and sanitation which persists in the south as a result of neglect from Khartoum, and it remains to be seen whether the equal split of oil revenues between the two regions will carry out as planned.

The International Response

The participation of the international community in helping the Sudanese people is crucial because, as we have seen, the government of Sudan is unable to protect them from violence or provide them with the basic necessities of life. To this extent, the international community has only had marginal success in solving the problems that persist.

To their credit, there has been active engagement in Southern Sudan during and after the negotiation of the CPA. Most importantly, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1590 which created the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) who were given the mandate of monitoring the ceasefire between the north and south and repatriating refugees. Additionally, as part of the CPA there was a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) that was given the task of researching and writing a plan for the development of Sudan for the 2005 – 2011 period. The JAM took 15 months to complete and called for \$7.9 billion to be spent on development, two thirds of which would be provided by the government and one third from the international community.⁴¹ Thus, two Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) monitored by the World Bank were established as a pool of international resources to be dedicated to projects in the Sudan. So far

³⁷ CIA World Factbook website

³⁸ IMF Country Report No. 06/182. International Monetary Fund. 2006.

³⁹ CIA World Factbook website

⁴⁰ IMF Country Report No. 06/182. International Monetary Fund. 2006.

⁴¹ Es-Sir Mahjoub, Tai. "Planning for Reconstruction: the Joint Assessment Mission." Accord (2006).

\$600 million has been contributed by thirteen countries, and that money is being spent in the most press sectors like sanitation, infrastructure, education, and health.⁴² However, Taj es-Sir Mahjoub, one of the assessors of the JAM, is skeptical of the government's proper implementation of the JAM's recommendations. He claims that "the Ministry of Finance has continued to operate the budget with only partial regard to the JAM's findings, reports and matrices, which makes it either difficult or futile for the Joint National Transitional Team to perform its stated task of ensuring that MDTF expenditure is in line with the JAM before funding is approved."⁴³

The international community is also having difficulty responding to the Darfur crisis. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union authorized a 7,000 strong force to the region in 2004, but they are currently unable to maintain any security for civilians in the region, let alone protect the imperative aid operations by groups like MSF and the Red Cross. Due to the under-funded and under-manned AU mission, many, including former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, have publicly called for a UN peacekeeping mission to the region of 17,300 troops. The Security Council even managed to pass a Resolution 1706 which determined that "the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security"⁴⁴ and authorized peacekeepers to be deployed. However, the international community has so far been lacking the collective will to back this Resolution as they remain adamant over obtaining consent from the government of Sudan for the deployment of UN troops. Part of this stalling is at the behest of China who has serious state-owned energy contracts in the Sudanese oil fields, and does not want to disrupt their friendly business relations with the Sudanese government. Thus, while hundreds of people continue to die every day, diplomats are focusing their efforts on pressuring al-Bashir to authorize some sort of UN involvement in Darfur. Although there appeared to be a breakthrough in November 2006 on the possibility of a joint AU-UN peacekeeping force, the government of Sudan remains adamant that the UN role would remain one of "logistical and financial support".⁴⁵ For at least the foreseeable future in 2007 it seems unlikely that Sudan's position will change, nor will that of NGO or the many international governments like Canada who support intervention but are unwilling to supply troops. One positive step was announced on January 29th, 2007 when it was decided at the 8th African Union Summit that Sudan would be bypassed for the second straight year in their bid to retain the AU presidency.⁴⁶ Instead the responsibility was given it to Ghana, a democratic country who, with some hope, can use their position on the Security Council to liaise between the AU and UN and push for real change in Darfur in the coming months.

Canada's Response

The Canadian government recognizes that fragile, failing, and failed states are a pressing global issue. Its response has been to focus its resources and funding to three specific countries: Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan. In Sudan their efforts are mainly channeled into providing financial support for humanitarian projects in Southern Sudan as well as supporting AMIS as it attempts to bring stability to Darfur.

⁴² World Bank MDTF website

⁴³ Es-Sir Mahjoub, Tai. "Planning for Reconstruction: the Joint Assessment Mission." Accord (2006)

⁴⁴ UNSC Resolution 1706

⁴⁵ "Sudan "Did Not" Give Ok Over International Force for Darfur - Top Official." Kuwait News Agency 17 Nov. 2006.

⁴⁶ BBC News

In April 2005 the government, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) donated \$90 million at the Oslo Donor's Conference on Sudan, with \$40 million going to the MDTFs, another \$40 million to humanitarian assistance, and \$10 million to bilateral reconstruction and rehabilitation programs.⁴⁷ In May 2006, an addition \$20 million was given to organizations to address humanitarian assistance, bringing Canada's total aid to Southern Sudan to \$110 million.⁴⁸ The Canadian government has also donated a total of \$210 million to AMIS, making it one of the top three financial contributors to the mission. Through *Operation AUGURAL*, the Department of Defense has provided \$1.4 million of basic army equipment like helmets and protective vests, and have "loaned 105 armed personnel carriers to enhance the capabilities of the AU mission in Darfur."⁴⁹ With these military vehicles, the government set up a training facility in Dakar, Senegal to train 150 Rwandan, Nigerian, and Senegalese soldier how to operate them.⁵⁰

We can surely be proud that our government has taken Sudan as a priority and has provided them with a total of \$300 million to help stabilize the country. It is even admirable that "Canada supports the transition from an African Union mission in Darfur to a United Nations mission consistent with the United Nations Security Council resolution 1706, including a stronger mandate for protection of civilian populations and personnel from the United Nations and other humanitarian aid organizations."⁵¹ Yet many believe that not enough is being done. Canadian Senator and (retired) Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire – the Force Commander for the UN mission in Rwanda in 1994 – has been incredibly outspoken about the lack of concrete international action on Darfur. In an op-ed in *The Globe and Mail* on September 14th, 2006 entitled 'History will judge Canada, not Sudan on the fate of Darfur' Dallaire claims that the responsibility to intervene in Darfur to stop human rights abuses lies on the Canadian government.⁵² He argues that the Security Council has done their job in authorizing force through Resolution 1706 – a legally binding document that doesn't actually require the consent of the government of Sudan – and that since major powers like Britain and the US are tied-up in Iraq, the "responsibility to protect" (R2P), a Canadian initiated doctrine, lies on the middle powers of the world like Canada, Germany, India, and Japan. He goes on to argue that we have 1,200 soldiers to offer as an initial combat force, but what we don't have, just like the rest of the world, is political will.

Conclusion

Conciliation Resources, a leading think-tank on conflict resolution and peacekeeping, occasionally publishes a journal named *Accord*, with each issue focusing on a specific case study. In December 2006, they published an issue on Sudan entitled "Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan's Conflicts". Not only does the title attest to the existence of numerous, devastating conflicts in Sudan, but it also is indicative of the nature of the government's response insofar as they have been wholly unable or unwilling to promote any sort of inclusive, national solution

⁴⁷ CIDA website <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-217124359-NT2?OpenDocument>

⁴⁸ DFAIT website <https://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadasudan/backgrounder-contributions-en.asp>

⁴⁹ DoD website http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/augural/index_e.asp

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade website

⁵² Dallaire, Romeo. "History Will Judge Canada, Not Sudan on the Fate of Darfur." Editorial. *The Globe and Mail* 14 Sept. 2006.

that addresses the root problems in the regions of the country beyond Khartoum. Certainly it is a complex task with no immediate solution. However if we want to work towards a solution there are a number of key areas we must focus on and begin to ask questions in the hope that we can find answers.

The most pressing questions pertain to the conflict in Darfur: Should the UN deploy troops to Darfur under Resolution 1706 without the consent of the government of Sudan? Is this legal? Should Canada provide troops as Senator Dallaire has suggested? How can the political will to do so be mobilized? Can we classify the crisis in Darfur as genocide? Does it matter if we do or should we focus our time on action rather than semantics? Other equally pressing questions dealing with bringing development to the most marginalized areas of the country including Southern Sudan: will the CPA and ESPA really help to bring concrete solutions to the underdevelopment and alienation in Sudan's regions outside Khartoum? How can the government be held more accountable in implementing the JAM and distributing its revenues equitably? Should the international community be giving more money to the World Bank and humanitarian organizations? How can we help foster legitimate opposition and fair governance in Sudan? It is imperative that we focus on the themes of conflict resolution, decentralization, and rural development in attempting to address the problems that run rampant in Sudan. The future looks bleak right now, but that means there is no better time to start working towards solutions.

Further Reading:

For a general background on conflict history and peacekeeping efforts in Sudan, the Accord publication is invaluable and can be located at: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/contents.php>.

Eric Reeves' website is also incredibly useful, as he'll post a new article on a weekly basis about the continuing crises in Sudan. If you're willing to search through his database, you'll find some great articles coming from one of the leading advocates for international support in Sudan. Located at <http://www.sudanreeves.org>

In addition, the Global Security website has a lot of background information but it is somewhat incoherent and more difficult to sift through:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm>

For data on political and social indicators, as well as for an update report on human rights issues, there are a whole range of NGOs and research institutions that write valuable reports on Darfur and Southern Sudan. It is essential to look at:

- 1) Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org
- 2) Transparency International www.transparency.org
- 3) Failed States Index <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php>
- 4) CIA World Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html>
- 5) International Crisis Group www.icg.org
- 6) Human Rights Watch www.hrw.org

Needless to say, there are many more

For the most reliable statistics on social services, the World Bank is by far the most accurate and comprehensive resource (despite many people's objections to their actual policies) If you have time it is really worthwhile to read some of their reports that outline potential development projects, especially the ones on health, sanitation, and education. The reports can be found at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SUDANEXTN/0,,menuPK:375449~pagePK:64026187~piPK:141126~theSitePK:375422,00.html>

Also, data on the sheer poverty of Southern Sudan can be read in the JAM report at <http://www.dep.no/ud/english/topics/sudan/conference/all/032041-120006/dok-bn.html>

Like the World Bank for development statistics, the IMF website has the most accurate statistics on macroeconomic performance, and they do an excellent job in outlining the reliance of Sudan's economy on the oil industry. It can be found at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06182.pdf>

Canada's response to the situation in Darfur and Southern Sudan can be documented on the CIDA, DFAIT and DoD websites. They are:

1) CIDA: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-217124359-NT2?OpenDocument>

2) DFAIT: <https://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadasudan/backgrounder-contributions-en.asp>

3) DoD: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/augural/index_e.asp

Finally, if you are interested in reading about what is currently happening in Sudan it is best to regularly read the BBC news at <http://news.bbc.co.uk> where there is a story almost every day. You can also read the archives to find some key information that may have happened in the past year.